Fishing for Excuses and Performance Evaluation
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- François Larmande & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2014. "Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation," Post-Print hal-02313124, HAL.
- François Larmande & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2013. "Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation," Working Papers hal-00825297, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Jonathan Glover & Carolyn B. Levine, 2019. "Information Asymmetries about Measurement Quality," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 50-71, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
performance measurement; manipulation; controllability principle; excuse culture; influence activity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-03-08 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2014-03-08 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2014-03-08 (Microeconomics)
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