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A contracting perspective on earnings quality

  • Christensen, Peter O.
  • Feltham, Gerald A.
  • Sabac, Florin
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4101(05)00023-6
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 39 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 265-294

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:39:y:2005:i:2:p:265-294
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae

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    5. Frøystein Gjesdal, 1982. "Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 373-390.
    6. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 704-719, Winter.
    7. Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J., 1993. "Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 3-23, April.
    8. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    9. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
    10. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2003. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 423-436, August.
    11. Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
    12. Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Working papers 442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    13. Indjejikian, Raffi & Nanda, Dhananjay, 1999. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 177-201, April.
    14. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
    15. James A. Brickley, 2002. "Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 511-535, October.
    16. Malcomson, J.M., 1997. "Contracts, hold-up and labor markets," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9703, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    17. Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein, 2003. "Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 837-866, December.
    18. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1990. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Papers 0004, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    19. Sunil Dutta, 2002. "Revenue Recognition in a Multiperiod Agency Setting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 67-83, 03.
    20. Dechow, Patricia M., 1994. "Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance : The role of accounting accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 3-42, July.
    21. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
    22. Holthausen, Robert W. & Watts, Ross L., 2001. "The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 3-75, September.
    23. Peter Ove Christensen, 2002. "Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1090, 09.
    24. Kormendi, Roger & Lipe, Robert, 1987. "Earnings Innovations, Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 323-45, July.
    25. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    26. Basu, Sudipta, 1997. "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-37, December.
    27. Kim, Son Ku, 1995. "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 89-102, January.
    28. Brickley, James A., 2003. "Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 227-233, December.
    29. Dechow, Patricia M. & Kothari, S. P. & L. Watts, Ross, 1998. "The relation between earnings and cash flows," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 133-168, May.
    30. Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1995. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 1107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    31. Jonathan C. Glover & Anil Arya & Shyam NMI Sunder, 1999. "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm120, Yale School of Management.
    32. Dechow, Patricia M. & Hutton, Amy P. & Sloan, Richard G., 1999. "An empirical assessment of the residual income valuation model1," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-3), pages 1-34, January.
    33. Meyer, Margaret A., 1995. "Cooperation and competition in organizations: A dynamic perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 709-722, April.
    34. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 589-619.
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