An Analysis of the Relation between the Stewardship and Valuation Roles of Earnings
In this paper, we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes. We explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation. A distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in Paul  produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients ("VEC"s) and compensation earnings coefficients ("CEC"s) are unrelated. Our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971-2000 rejects Paul's  hypothesis of no relation. We also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation. Specifically, we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2006.
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Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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