Revenue Recognition in a Multiperiod Agency Setting

This paper examines how various revenue recognition rules affect the incentive properties of accounting information in a stewardship setting. Our analysis demonstrates that if revenues are recognized according to the realization principle, a single performance measure based on aggregated accounting information can be used to provide desirable production and effort incentives to the manager. In contrast, mark‐to‐market accounting does not provide efficient aggregation of raw information to solve the stewardship problem. Mark‐to‐market accounting, though sensible from a valuation perspective, fails to provide desirable incentives because it relies on the anticipated, rather than the actual, performance of the manager. We also consider a setting in which the manager can control the timing of the firm’s sales. It then becomes desirable to modify the realization principle and apply the lower‐of‐cost‐or‐market valuation rule. The desirable accounting thus exhibits a conservative bias.