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Gestaltung von Erfolgsrechnungen zur Steuerung langfristiger Projekte

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  • Christian Hofmann

    (Universität Tübingen)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In zahlreichen Branchen kommt langfristigen Projekten wie der mehrjährigen Auftragsfertigung oder der F&E eine große Bedeutung zu. Für das Controlling besteht eine zentrale Aufgabe darin, Anreizverträge sowie mehrperiodige Erfolgsrechnungen zu entwickeln, damit die verantwortlichen Manager unternehmenswertsteigernde Entscheidungen treffen. Bei langfristigen Projekten ist hierbei als wichtiger Einflussfaktor zu beachten, dass rationale Entscheidungsträger im Zeitablauf die geschlossenen Verträge an neue Informationen anpassen können (sequenzielle Rationalität). Der Beitrag vergleicht die Steuerung von Projektleitern über Cashflow-Rechnungen und über Periodenerfolgsrechnungen. Während bei der Cashflow-Rechnung der Projekterfolg mit dem Zahlungseingang zum Projektende realisiert wird, verteilt man bei der Periodenerfolgsrechnung den Projekterfolg auf die Perioden. Dazu sind zusätzliche Informationen von Projektzwischenberichten erforderlich. Die Modellergebnisse zeigen Bedingungen auf, bei denen eine der beiden Rechnungen dominiert. Die Dominanz ist insbesondere von dem Informationsgehalt des Zwischenberichts abhängig. Letztlich zeigt sich, dass für die betrachtete Problemstellung ein mehr an Informationen nicht durchweg den Unternehmenserfolg steigert.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Hofmann, 2005. "Gestaltung von Erfolgsrechnungen zur Steuerung langfristiger Projekte," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 57(8), pages 689-716, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:57:y:2005:i:8:d:10.1007_bf03371638
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371638
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Hofmann & Erik Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2008. "Kontrollrechte und Anreize in Supply Chains," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(59), pages 1-29, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D82; M52; M40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General

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