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Universal mechanisms
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- Nathalie Greenan & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Patricia Crifo, 2004.
"Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?,"
Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
- Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(3), pages 27-55.
- Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03898034, HAL.
- Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Post-Print hal-03898034, HAL.
- Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011.
"How to talk to multiple audiences,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
- Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007.
"Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
- Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- , & ,, 2012.
"Mechanism design and communication networks,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543602, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543604, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543605, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543571, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543601, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543608, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543607, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543606, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543603, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2009. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00495923, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.
- Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Working Papers hal-00540799, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543609, HAL.
- , & ,, 2013.
"Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
- Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo.
- Vida Peter & Francoise Forges, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case," Post-Print hal-01252955, HAL.
- Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014.
"Communication in Cournot oligopoly,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
- Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012.
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Post-Print hal-00715606, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval, 2010.
"Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
- Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
- Zhuozheng Li & Huanxing Yang & Lan Zhang, 2019. "Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 109-141, March.
- Wolinsky, Asher, 2002.
"Eliciting information from multiple experts,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gossner, Olivier, 1998.
"Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1361, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989.
"Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
- Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005.
"Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions,"
Working Papers
2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003.
"Long Cheap Talk,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998.
"Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
- Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996. "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," THEMA Working Papers 96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008.
"Long persuasion games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
- Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00360719, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo.
- Eilon Solan, 2000. "Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1298, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006.
"Optimal Use of Communication Resources,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1603-1636, November.
- Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Olivier Gossner & Pénélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006. "Optimal use of communication resources," Post-Print halshs-00754118, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013.
"A detail-free mediator,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
- Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998.
"Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Gossner, O., 1999. "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers 99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Hasker, Kevin, 2000. "Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games," Working Papers 2000-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997.
"One-Shot Public Mediated Talk,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
- Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Francisco Silva, 2023. "Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 720-737, July.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
- Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021.
"Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
- Renault, Jérôme & Forges, Françoise, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," TSE Working Papers 21-1216, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval," Post-Print hal-02440627, HAL.
- Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
- Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005.
"Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
- F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6031 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007.
"Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2020. "Two definitions of correlated equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 12-24.
- Françoise Forges, 2006.
"Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
- FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
- Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011.
"Perfect implementation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
- Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Rabah Amir & Sergei Belkov & Igor V. Evstigneev, 2017.
"Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 457-468, December.
- Rabah Amir & Sergei Belkov & Igor V. Evstigneev, 2017. "Correlated Equilibrium in a Nutshell," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1706, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Olivier Gossner, 1997. "Protocoles de communication robustes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 685-695.
- Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Julian Jamison, 2020. "Valuable Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-14, August.
- Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
- John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Sep 1996.
- Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
- Gerardi, Dino, 2004.
"Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
- Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004.
"Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
- Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
- Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023.
"Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-14, June.
- Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2005. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, revised Nov 2009.
- Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2017. "A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 9-19, April.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
- Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
- Michele Crescenzi, 2022. "Coordination through ambiguous language," Papers 2211.03426, arXiv.org.
- Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.