Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- F. Forges, 2010.
"An Approach to Communication Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
516, David K. Levine.
- Forges, F., 1987.
CORE Discussion Papers
1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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