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Citations for "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments"

by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite

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  1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2009. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1689-1713, December.
  2. Nosaka, Hiromi, 2007. "Specialization and competition in marriage models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 104-119, May.
  3. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1810, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  5. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
  6. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2011. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2011/561, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  7. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  8. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
  9. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2009. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 253-281.
  10. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2002. "Does poaching distort training?," Working Paper Series 4/2002, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
  11. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jun 2003.
  12. Charlot, Olivier & Decreuse, Bruno & Granier, Pierre, 2005. "Adaptability, productivity, and educational incentives in a matching model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1007-1032, May.
  13. Bester, Helmut, 2009. "Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 7332, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," ESE Discussion Papers 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  15. George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  16. Sergei Severinov & Michael Peters, 2004. "Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 551, Econometric Society.
  17. de Meza, David & Lockwood, Ben, 2010. "Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 503-511, July.
  18. Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," ESE Discussion Papers 134, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  19. Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  20. Olivier Charlot & Bruno Decreuse, 2006. "Over-education for the rich vs under-education for the poor: a search-theoretic microfoundation," Working Papers halshs-00409583, HAL.
  21. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Pricing in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000011, David K. Levine.
  22. Lucas Navarro, 2010. "Efficiency of Two Sided Investments in an Equilibrium Unemployment Framework," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv260, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  23. Ramya Sundaram, 2000. "Multiple Traits in the Marriage Market: Does Diversity Sometimes Win?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1666, Econometric Society.
  24. Marcel Jansen, 2003. "Can Job Competition Prevent Hold-Ups?," Economics Working Papers we035120, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  25. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2000. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1784, Econometric Society.
  26. Ximena Peña, 2006. "Assortative Matching and the Education Gap," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 002032, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  27. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
  28. Francesca Flamini, 2002. "Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games," Working Papers 2002_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  29. Andrea, Canidio, 2009. "The production of science," MPRA Paper 25218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Andrea, Canidio, 2010. "Absorptive capacity, the allocation of scientists, and firms' research productivity," MPRA Paper 30257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Bidner, Chris, 2010. "Pre-match investment with frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 23-34, January.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.