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Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Juan‐Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzman, 2010. "Output‐Expanding Collusion In The Presence Of A Competitive Fringe," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 106-126, March.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  4. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0010 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. I. Lubashevsky & S. Kanemoto, 2010. "Scale-free memory model for multiagent reinforcement learning. Mean field approximation and rock-paper-scissors dynamics," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 76(1), pages 69-85, July.
  6. Chari V. V. & Kehoe Patrick J., 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Debt," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 230-261, December.
  7. W. Hichri & A. Kirman, 2007. "The emergence of coordination in public good games," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 55(2), pages 149-159, January.
  8. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
  9. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003. "Bad Reputation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  11. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July.
  12. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," Penn CARESS Working Papers bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027c, Penn Economics Department.
  13. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games," Economics Series Working Papers 199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  14. K. Schmidt, 1999. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 626, David K. Levine.
  15. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  16. Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
  17. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine.
  18. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 175-195.
  19. repec:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:295-317 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0007 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "A Theory of Group Inequality," Discussion Paper Series 1309, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  22. Zhijian Wang & Yanran Zhou & Jaimie W. Lien & Jie Zheng & Bin Xu, 2016. "Extortion Can Outperform Generosity in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001297, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  24. Balanquit, Romeo, 2010. "Tolerance, Cooperation, and Equilibrium Restoration in Repeated Games," MPRA Paper 21877, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
  26. Per Overgaard, 1992. "Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June.
  27. Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games," Working Papers 284, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  28. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
  29. Waknis, Parag, 2014. "A Leviathan central bank: Modeling seigniorage in a money search model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 386-391.
  30. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
  31. Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min, 2018. "Matching in the large: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 295-317.
  32. Majumdar, Mukul & Yoo, Seung Han, 2011. "Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling," Working Papers 11-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  33. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0017 is not listed on IDEAS
  35. repec:spr:dyngam:v:9:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-018-0289-z is not listed on IDEAS
  36. repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001297 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. D Vandegrift, 2001. "Quality‐Assuring Price And Breach Of Express Or Implied Warranty," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(2), pages 186-196, April.
  38. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 17, pages 369-388, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  39. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2010. "Dismissals and quits in repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 67-80, April.
  40. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  41. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
  42. repec:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:2:p:26-:d:238459 is not listed on IDEAS
  43. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  44. Mukul Majumdar & Seung Yoo, 2012. "Strategic analysis of influence peddling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 737-762, November.
  45. Breig, Zachary, 2019. "Endogenous and exogenous commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  46. Waknis, Parag, 2017. "Competitive Supply of Money in a New Monetarist Model," MPRA Paper 75401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  47. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  48. Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  49. Christian Schultz, 2005. "Virtual Capacity and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1487, CESifo Group Munich.
  50. Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu, 2011. "On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 419-434, September.
  51. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  52. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
  53. Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.
  54. M. Sysi-Aho & J. Saramäki & J. Kertész & K. Kaski, 2005. "Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 44(1), pages 129-135, March.
  55. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
  56. J François Outreville, 2010. "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(3), pages 484-497, July.
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