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Citations for "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability"

by A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky

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  1. Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors," ESE Discussion Papers 77, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Shimoji, Makoto, 2012. "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 441-447.
  3. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  4. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-77, February.
  5. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
  6. Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
  8. Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2001. "Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(11), pages 1801-1825, November.
  9. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  10. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
  11. Gilli, Mario, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May.
  12. Michael McBride, 2003. "Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000265, David K. Levine.
  13. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
  14. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  15. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  16. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "An Equilibrium Framework for Players with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org.
  17. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  18. Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Justifiable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 375-390.
  19. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  20. Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  21. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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