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Citations for "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability"

by A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky

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  1. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152,, revised Aug 2015.
  2. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine.
  3. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2004. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Scholarly Articles 3200612, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  6. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  7. Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Justifiable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 375-390.
  8. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  9. P Battigalli & S Cerreia-Vioglio & F Maccheroni & M Marinacci, 2012. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000376, David K. Levine.
  10. Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  11. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors," ESE Discussion Papers 77, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  13. McBride, Michael, 2008. "Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 283-295, September.
  14. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier.
  15. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  16. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May.
  17. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  18. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
  19. Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2001. "Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(11), pages 1801-1825, November.
  20. Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  21. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  22. Shimoji, Makoto, 2012. "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 441-447.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.