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Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gilli, Mario, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May.
  2. Wolfgang Kuhle, 2024. "Games with Planned Actions and Scouting," Papers 2408.09778, arXiv.org.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2018. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 364-381.
  4. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  5. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004. "Learning to play Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
  6. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2022. "Observing actions in global games," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(12), pages 1-15, December.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-573, May.
  8. Shimoji, Makoto, 2012. "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 441-447.
  9. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
  10. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
  11. Foerster, Manuel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2021. "Shadow links," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    • FOERSTER Manuel, & MAULEON Ana, & VANNETELBOSCH Vincent,, 2018. "Shadow links," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2018030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Foerster, Manuel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2021. "Shadow links," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3171, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
  13. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  14. McBride, Michael, 2008. "Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 283-295, September.
  15. Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
  16. Desgranges, Gabriel & Gauthier, Stéphane, 2016. "Rationalizability and efficiency in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 163-176.
  17. Bayer, Péter & Guerdjikova, Ani, 2024. "Optimism leads to optimality: Ambiguity in network formation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
  18. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  19. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2016. "Berk–Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1093-1130, May.
  20. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2016. "Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 147-177, August.
  21. József Sákovics, 2001. "Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 347-366, June.
  22. Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  23. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 1-29.
  24. , & ,, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  25. Salgado Alfredo, 2020. "Many-to-one Matching: Externalities and Stability," Working Papers 2020-03, Banco de México.
  26. Jernej Copic, 2015. "Disagreement, information and welfare," 2015 Meeting Papers 1344, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  27. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  28. Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022. "Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  29. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  30. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  31. Antoni Rubi-Barcelo, 2013. "Categorical Segregation from a Game Theoretical Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(1), pages 85-120, May.
  32. Kuhle, Wolfgang, 2021. "Equilibrium with computationally constrained agents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 77-92.
  33. Joseph Greenberg, 2000. "The Right to Remain Silent," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 193-204, March.
  34. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
  35. Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Justifiable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 375-390.
  36. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2019. "Observing Actions in Bayesian Games," Papers 1904.10744, arXiv.org.
  37. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2021. "Observing Actions in Global Games," Papers 2111.10554, arXiv.org.
  38. Giacomo Bonanno, 2021. "Rational play in games: A behavioral approach," Working Papers 344, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  39. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2018. "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2128R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2022.
  40. Elchanan Mossel & Manuel Mueller‐Frank & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2020. "Social Learning Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 1235-1267, May.
  41. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2019. "Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 185-218.
  42. Xiao Luo & Ben Wang, 2022. "An epistemic characterization of MACA," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 995-1024, June.
  43. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  44. Sass, Linda, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 478, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  45. Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone & Maccheroni, Fabio & Schmeidler, David, 2022. "Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 110-131.
  46. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  47. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
  48. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2018. "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2128R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2021.
  49. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2020. "Biased-Belief Equilibrium," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 1-40, May.
  50. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2017. "Redefinition of Belief Distorted Nash Equilibria for the Environment of Dynamic Games with Probabilistic Beliefs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 984-1007, March.
  52. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
  53. Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2001. "Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(11), pages 1801-1825, November.
  54. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Davide Bordoli, 2025. "Sophisticated reasoning, learning, and equilibrium in repeated games with imperfect feedback," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 421-464, September.
  55. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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