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Citations for "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability"

by A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky

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  1. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier.
  2. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  3. Gilli, Mario, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May.
  4. Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  6. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  7. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. P Battigalli & S Cerreia-Vioglio & F Maccheroni & M Marinacci, 2012. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000376, David K. Levine.
  9. Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Justifiable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 375-390.
  10. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  12. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  13. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  14. Michael McBride, 2003. "Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000265, David K. Levine.
  15. Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2001. "Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(11), pages 1801-1825, November.
  16. Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  17. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
  18. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
  19. Shimoji, Makoto, 2012. "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 441-447.
  20. Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors," ESE Discussion Papers 77, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  21. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "An Equilibrium Framework for Players with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org.
  22. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
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