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Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium

  • Shimoji, Makoto

We introduce a condition, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium. If beliefs are assumed to be independent and unitary, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are outcome-equivalent. We show that the set of Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibria and the set of self-confirming equilibria which are outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibria coincide. Our condition identifies the collection of information sets and requires the existence of beliefs shared by (certain sets of) players regarding these information sets. If the information sets are off the equilibrium path, the beliefs regarding them do not have to be correct. Our condition is weaker than that of strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium by Kamada (2010).

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611001746
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 441-447

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:441-447
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Yuichiro Kamada, 2010. "Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 823-832, 03.
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  3. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March.
  4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine.
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