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Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
[Mindeststeuern können Steuerwettbewerb verstärken]

Author

Listed:
  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Konrad, Kai A., 2008. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
    [Mindeststeuern können Steuerwettbewerb verstärken]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200810
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morten Hvidt & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2001. "Non-cooperative vs. Minimum-Rate Commodity Taxation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(4), pages 315-326, November.
    2. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd & Mintz, Jack, 2005. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 1-62, December.
    3. Rosanne Altshuler & Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2015. "Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and US Tax Competition," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(4), pages 485-504, July.
    4. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    5. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    6. Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 708-726, November.
    7. You-Qiang Wang, 1999. "Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 974-981, September.
    8. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Jack Mintz, 2003. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 956, CESifo Group Munich.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:682-694 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Haufler, Andreas & Lülfesmann, Christoph, 2015. "Reforming an asymmetric union: On the virtues of dual tier capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 116-127.
    3. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2017. "On The Desirability Of Tax Coordination When Countries Compete In Taxes And Infrastructure," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 682-694, April.
    4. Áron Kiss, 2012. "Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(5), pages 641-649, October.
    5. Hikaru Ogawa, 2013. "Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(3), pages 474-484, June.
    6. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    7. Działo Joanna, 2015. "Tax Competition Or Tax Coordination? What Is Better For The European Union? / Konkurewncja Podatkowa Czy Koordynacja Podatków? Co Jest Lepsze Dla Unii Europejskiej?," Comparative Economic Research, De Gruyter Open, vol. 18(2), pages 37-55, June.
    8. Beáta Blechová, 2016. "The competition analysis in the field of corporate income tax in the EU," Working Papers 0028, Silesian University, School of Business Administration.
    9. Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2012. "Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 146-148.
    10. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate income; capital income; taxation; tax competition; minimum tax; tax coordination; Stackelberg;

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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