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Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • HINDRIKS Jean,

    (CORE, Université catholique de louvain)

  • NISHIMURA Yukihiro,

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments: the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement (i.e., controls on profit shifting by multinational enterprises). Tougher enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. In a framework of noncooperative tax choices, we compare the equilibria of the noncooperative and cooperative enforcement choices. After showing that enforcement cooperation may not benefit the low-tax country, we indicate two drivers that promote enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is complementarity (imperfect substitutability) of countries’ enforcement efforts, taking into account that dispersed enforcement efforts among the involved countries are less effective. We show that cooperation is more likely with greater enforcement complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership, which reduces the extent of disagreement on tax enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • HINDRIKS Jean, & NISHIMURA Yukihiro,, 2018. "Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2018029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2018029
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hayato Kato & Hirofumi Okoshi, 2022. "Economic Integration And Agglomeration Of Multinational Production With Transfer Pricing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1325-1355, August.
    2. Xie, Chengyuan & Huang, Lu, 2024. "How to drive sustainable economic development: The role of fintech, natural resources, and social vulnerability," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    3. Jean Hindriks & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2021. "Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 487-509, June.
    4. Rabah Amir & Evangelia Chalioti & Christine Halmenschlager, 2021. "University–firm competition in basic research: Simultaneous versus sequential moves," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1199-1219, December.
    5. Jean Hindriks & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2025. "Minimum tax, Tax haven and Activity shifting," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 25-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    6. Hirofumi OKOSHI, 2021. "Innovation for Tax Avoidance: Product Differentiation and the Arm's Length Principle," Discussion papers 21038, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    7. Hindriks, Jean & Nishimura, Yukihiro, 2021. "Why Minimum Corporate Income Taxation Can Make the High-Tax Countries Worse off: the Compliance Dilemma," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Hirofumi OKOSHI, 2024. "Negotiation for Transfer Prices under the Arm's Length Principle," Discussion papers 24026, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    9. Takaaki Hamada, 2023. "Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 570-614, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • F68 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Policy
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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