IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition

  • Johannes Becker

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law)

  • Clemens Fuest

    ()

    (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)

This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_09/WP0930.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its series Working Papers with number 0930.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:0930
Contact details of provider: Postal: Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP UK
Phone: +44 (0)1865 288800
Fax: +44 (0)1865 288805
Web page: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/tax/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Sam Bucovetsky & Andreas Haufler, 2005. "Tax Competition when Firms Choose their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1625, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 22085, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  3. PERALTA, Susana & WAUTHY, Xavier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, . "Should countries control international profit shifting?," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1795, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, 2006. "Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens," NBER Working Papers 12225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Qing Hong & Michael Smart, 2007. "In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and Foreign Direct Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 1942, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Harry Grubert & Joel Slemrod, 1994. "The Effect of Taxes on Investment and Income Shifting to Puerto Rico," NBER Working Papers 4869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September.
  8. Keen, Michael, 2001. "Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 4), pages 757-62, December.
  9. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:0930. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dongxian Guo)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.