Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.
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