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NONCOOPERATIVE vs MINIMUM-RATE COMMODITY TAXATION

Author

Listed:
  • Hvidt, Morten

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Nielsen, Søren Bo

    (University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates, within a simple two-country model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping, that the tax revenue (welfare) effects of a minimum tax requirement depend crucially on the character of the initial noncooperative tax equilibrium, i.e. whether it is Nash or Stackelberg.

Suggested Citation

  • Hvidt, Morten & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2000. "NONCOOPERATIVE vs MINIMUM-RATE COMMODITY TAXATION," Working Papers 17-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2000_017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. You-Qiang Wang, 1999. "Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 974-981, September.
    2. Jack Mintz & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 449-489, Springer.
    3. Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 435-457, March.
    4. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    5. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hindriks, Jean & Nishimura, Yukihiro, 2015. "A note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 66-68.
    2. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February.
    3. Andrés Leal & Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo, 2010. "Cross-Border Shopping: A Survey," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 16(2), pages 135-148, May.
    4. Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2002. "Cross-border shopping from small to large countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 309-313, November.
    5. Vidar Christiansen, "undated". "Cross-border shopping and tax structure," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    6. HINDRIKS, Jean & nishimura, YUKIHIRO, 2014. "International tax leadership among asymmetric countries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commodity tax; Minimum rate;

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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