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Endogenizing leadership in the tax competition race




In this paper, we extend the stansard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late, i.e. to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage. We highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second-mover advantage. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem. In order to solve this issue, we consider a quadratic specification of the production function, and we use two criteria of selection. Pareto-dominance and riskk-dominance. We emphasize that at the safer equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second-mover advantage. If asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance in selecting the same SPE. Three results may be deduced from our analysis: (i) the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted; (ii) the smaller jurisdiction leads; (iii) the "big-country-higher-tax-rate" rule does not always hold

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  • Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in the tax competition race," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10039

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    1. Dominique Guegan & Pierre-André Maugis, 2008. "New prospects on vines," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08095, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Mar 2010.
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    6. Andrew J. Patton, 2006. "Modelling Asymmetric Exchange Rate Dependence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 527-556, May.
    7. Aas, Kjersti & Czado, Claudia & Frigessi, Arnoldo & Bakken, Henrik, 2009. "Pair-copula constructions of multiple dependence," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 182-198, April.
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    More about this item


    Endogenous timing; tax competition; first/second-mover advantage; strategic complements; Stackelberg; Risk dominance;

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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