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Employment protection and product market competition
[Kündigungsschutz und der Wettbewerb auf Produktmärkten]

  • Kessing, Sebastian

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.

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Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number FS IV 02-31.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0231
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  1. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  2. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  3. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2002. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series 689, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Koeniger, Winfried, 2002. "Employment Protection, Product Market Competition and Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 554, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  6. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1996. "Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1338, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. repec:dgr:kubcen:200248 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August.
  9. Giulio Fella, 2000. "Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs," Working Papers 418, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  10. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  11. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Repeated Expropriation Contests and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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