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Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs




We study non-contractible firms' investment in general training in a model of frictional unemployment. Since training is vested in workers, firms' return to training is zero when a match ends. Consensual layoff provisions or large severance payments oblige firms to bargain efficiently over the joint payoff from separation. This increases employers' incentives to train as they share workers' outside return to general human capital. The result generalizes to all types of general investment that are vested in the non-investing party on separation. We also show that, independently from underinvestment in training, the laissez-faire equilibrium is always inefficient for any given level of investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Giulio Fella, 2000. "Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs," Working Papers 418, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp418

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dietmar Harhoff & Thomas J. Kane, 1993. "Financing Apprenticeship Training: Evidence from Germany," NBER Working Papers 4557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Daron Acemoglu, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 445-464.
    3. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
    4. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
    5. Pedro Portugal & Olivier Blanchard, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March.
    6. Masters, Adrian M, 1998. "Efficiency of Investment in Human and Physical Capital in a Model of Bilateral Search and Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 477-494, May.
    7. Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M., 1991. "Investments, Hold Up and the Reform of Market Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9114, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    8. Che, Y.K. & Chung, T.Y., 1995. "Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments," Working papers 9524, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    9. Giulio Fella, 1999. "When Do Firing Costs Matter?," Working Papers 400, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian G. Kessing, 2006. "Employment Protection and Product Market Competition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 339-352, July.
    2. Koeniger, Winfried, 2002. "Employment Protection, Product Market Competition and Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 554, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Gérard Ballot & Fathi Fakhfakh & Erol Taymaz, 2002. "Who benefits from training and R&D: The firm or the workers? A study on panels of French and Swedish firms," ERC Working Papers 0201, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Jan 2002.
    4. Riccardo Tilli, 2015. "High speed and low speed structural reforms in the italian goods and labor market," QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(103), pages 67-82.
    5. Koeniger, Winfried, 2003. "Collective Dismissal Cost, Product Market Competition and Innovation," IZA Discussion Papers 888, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item


    Consensual layoffs; General training; Matching;

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings


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