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Employment Protection And Product Market Competition

  • Sebastian Kessing

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, "ex ante" such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2006 .

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Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 with number 50.

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Date of creation: 17 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2004:50
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  1. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2002. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series 689, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Koeniger, Winfried, 2002. "Employment Protection, Product Market Competition and Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 554, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August.
  4. Gilles Saint-Paul, 1996. "Employment Protection, International Specialization, and innovation," IMF Working Papers 96/16, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  6. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  7. Giulio Fella, 2000. "Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs," Working Papers 418, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  8. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Repeated Expropriation Contests and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  10. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
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