Shaming for tax enforcement: Evidence from a new policy
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dwenger, Nadja & Treber, Lukas, 2018. "Shaming for Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a New Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 13194, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Leonardo Bursztyn & Robert Jensen, 2017.
"Social Image and Economic Behavior in the Field: Identifying, Understanding, and Shaping Social Pressure,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 9(1), pages 131-153, September.
- Leonardo Bursztyn & Robert Jensen, 2016. "Social Image and Economic Behavior in the Field: Identifying, Understanding and Shaping Social Pressure," NBER Working Papers 23013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Erlend E. Bø & Joel Slemrod & Thor O. Thoresen, 2015.
"Taxes on the Internet: Deterrence Effects of Public Disclosure,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 36-62, February.
- Joel Slemrod & Thor Olav Thoresen & Erlend Eide Bø, 2013. "Taxes on the Internet: Deterrence Effects of Public Disclosure," CESifo Working Paper Series 4107, CESifo.
- Erlend E. Bø & Joel Slemrod & Thor O. Thoresen, 2014. "Taxes on the internet. Deterrence effects of public disclosure," Discussion Papers 770, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Doerrenberg, Philipp & Peichl, Andreas, 2017.
"Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
17-045, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Doerrenberg, Philipp & Peichl, Andreas, 2018. "Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 11714, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Philipp Doerrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2017. "Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity - Evidence from a randomized survey experiment," ifo Working Paper Series 242, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Philipp Dörrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2018. "Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity. Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7149, CESifo.
- Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, 2006. "Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 130-134, May.
- Pierre C. Boyer & Nadja Dwenger & Johannes Rincke, 2014.
"Do Taxes Crowd Out Intrinsic Motivation? Field-Experimental Evidence from Germany,"
tax-mpg-rps-2014-23, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Rincke, Johannes & Boyer, Pierre & Dwenger, Nadja, 2015. "Do Taxes Crowd Out Intrinsic Motivation? Field-Experimental Evidence from Germany," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112951, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
- Hallsworth, Michael & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Vlaev, Ivo, 2017.
"The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 14-31.
- Michael Hallsworth & John List & Robert Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The Behavioralist As Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance," NBER Working Papers 20007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John List & Robert Metcalfe & Michael Taylor & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance," Natural Field Experiments 00391, The Field Experiments Website.
- Rege, Mari & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1625-1644, July.
- Scott D. Dyreng & Jeffrey L. Hoopes & Jaron H. Wilde, 2016. "Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 147-186, March.
- Makoto Hasegawa & Jefrey L. Hoopes & Ryo Ishida & Joel Slemrod, 2013. "The Effect of Public Disclosure on Reported Taxable Income: Evidence From Individuals and Corporations in Japan," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(3), pages 571-608, September.
- Andreoni, James & Petrie, Ragan, 2004.
"Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1605-1623, July.
- James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, 2003. "Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse Into Fund-Raising," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000520, David K. Levine.
- Joel Slemrod & Caroline Weber, 2012. "Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 25-53, February.
- Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001.
"Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March.
- Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: Evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota," Natural Field Experiments 00332, The Field Experiments Website.
- Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2013. "Testing Enforcement Strategies In The Field: Threat, Moral Appeal And Social Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 634-660, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Slemrod, Joel & Ur Rehman, Obeid & Waseem, Mazhar, 2020.
"How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
14463, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joel Slemrod & Obeid Ur Rehman & Mazhar Waseem, 2020. "How do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan," CESifo Working Paper Series 8152, CESifo.
More about this item
Keywordscompliance; tax debt; shaming; enforcement; social image concerns; penalty;
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EXP-2018-10-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2018-10-15 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2018-10-15 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2018-10-15 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2018-10-15 (Public Finance)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:hohdps:212018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fwhohde.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.