IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bubdps/192019.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Banks' holdings of risky sovereign bonds in the absence of the nexus: Yield seeking with central bank funding or de-risking?

Author

Listed:
  • Frey, Rainer
  • Weth, Mark

Abstract

For the largest 55 German banks, we detect the presence of countercyclical yield seeking in the form of acquisition of high-yielding periphery bonds in the period from Q1 2008 to Q2 2011. This investment strategy is pursued by banks not subject to a bailout, banks characterised by high capitalisation, banks that rely on short-term wholesale funding, and trading banks. In the subsequent period up to 2014, these banks switched to a procyclical divestment strategy resulting in the sale of risky assets. Following the launch of the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) in 2015, a clear investment pattern can no longer be identified. Unlike existing evidence for banks domiciled in vulnerable countries, we find that the recourse to central bank finance is rather limited and does not affect the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the non-stressed country Germany. Yield-seeking strategies were predominantly pursued by healthy banks in Germany. This contrasts with the increases in domestic sovereign holdings in vulnerable countries which can be primarily regarded as the result of moral suasion or, for weakly capitalised banks, a kind of "indirect" moral suasion or "home-biased" gambling for resurrection.

Suggested Citation

  • Frey, Rainer & Weth, Mark, 2019. "Banks' holdings of risky sovereign bonds in the absence of the nexus: Yield seeking with central bank funding or de-risking?," Discussion Papers 19/2019, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:192019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/197964/1/1667368354.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlo Altavilla & Marco Pagano & Saverio Simonelli, 2017. "Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2103-2139.
    2. Abbassi, Puriya & Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis & Tous, Francesc R., 2016. "Securities trading by banks and credit supply: Micro-evidence from the crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 569-594.
    3. Clemens Bonner, 2016. "Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(6), pages 1195-1221, September.
    4. Nicola Gennaioli & Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, 2014. "Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 819-866, April.
    5. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
    7. Buch, Claudia M. & Koetter, Michael & Ohls, Jana, 2016. "Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-15.
    8. Claudia Buch & Cathérine Koch & Michael Koetter, 2018. "Crises and Rescues: Liquidity Transmission through Global Banks," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 14(4), pages 187-228, September.
    9. Abbassi, Puriya & Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis & Tous, Francesc R., 2016. "Securities trading by banks and credit supply: Micro-evidence from the crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 569-594.
    10. Itamar Drechsler & Thomas Drechsel & David Marques-Ibanez & Philipp Schnabl, 2016. "Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1933-1974, October.
    11. Filippo De Marco, 2017. "Bank Lending and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers 213, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    12. Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry & Ioannidou, Vasso, 2015. "Determinants and Valuation Effects of the Home Bias in European Banks' Sovereign Debt Portfolios," CEPR Discussion Papers 10661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Itzhak Ben-David & Ajay A. Palvia & René M. Stulz, 2019. "Do Distressed Banks Really Gamble for Resurrection?," NBER Working Papers 25794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Frey, Rainer, 2016. "Multinational banks’ deleveraging in the Global Financial Crisis," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 90-113.
    15. Gros, Daniel, 2017. "Banks as buyers of last resort for government bonds?," CEPS Papers 13226, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign-bank nexus; sovereign bond holdings; yield seeking; moral suasion; capital adequacy; expansionary monetary policy; home bias; Sovereign-bank nexus; sovereign bond holdings; yield seeking; moral suasion; capital adequacy; expansionary monetary policy; home bias;

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:192019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dbbgvde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.