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Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds

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  • Bonner, Clemens

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks’ demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction-level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks’ demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this "regulatory effect" leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonner, Clemens, 2015. "Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds," Discussion Paper 2015-056, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:049e0e5e-f57b-4ef8-ab8b-bcbd00568d6e
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/8932467/2015_056.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2004. "Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 455-483, June.
    2. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 281-355, June.
    3. Clemens Bonner & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2012. "The Impact of the LCR on the Interbank Money Market," DNB Working Papers 364, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    4. Nicola Gennaioli & Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, 2014. "Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 819-866, April.
    5. repec:eee:moneco:v:98:y:2018:i:c:p:98-113 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:dgr:kubcen:2012075 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    8. Gennaioli, Nicola & Martin, Alberto & Rossi, Stefano, 2018. "Banks, government Bonds, and Default: What do the data Say?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 98-113.
    9. Buch, Claudia M. & Koetter, Michael & Ohls, Jana, 2016. "Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-15.
    10. de Haan, Leo & van den End, Jan Willem, 2013. "Bank liquidity, the maturity ladder, and regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3930-3950.
    11. Clemens Bonner & Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger, 2016. "The Impact of Liquidity Regulation on Bank Intermediation," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(5), pages 1945-1979.
    12. Ryan N. Banerjee & Hitoshi Mio, 2014. "The Impact of Liquidity Regulation on Banks," BIS Working Papers 470, Bank for International Settlements.
    13. Alexander Popov & Neeltje van Horen, 2013. "The impact of sovereign debt exposure on bank lending: Evidence from the European debt crisis," DNB Working Papers 382, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    14. Clemens Bonner & Iman Lelyveld & Robert Zymek, 2015. "Banks’ Liquidity Buffers and the Role of Liquidity Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 215-234, December.
    15. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    16. Anna Brown & Michael Davies & Daniel Fabbro & Tegan Hanrick, 2010. "Recent Developments in Banks' Funding Costs and Lending Rates," RBA Bulletin, Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 35-44, March.
    17. Daniel Fabbro & Mark Hack, 2011. "The Effects of Funding Costs and Risk on Banks' Lending Rates," RBA Bulletin, Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 35-42, March.
    18. Allen Berger & Robert DeYoung & Mark Flannery & David Lee & Özde Öztekin, 2008. "How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 34(2), pages 123-149, December.
    19. Jens Dick-Nielsen & Jacob Gyntelberg & Thomas Sangill, 2012. "Liquidity in Government versus Covered Bond Markets," BIS Working Papers 392, Bank for International Settlements.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. S. Demiralp & J. Eisenschmidt & T. Vlassopoulos, 2017. "Negative interest rates, excess liquidity and bank business models: Banks’ reaction to unconventional monetary policy in the euro area," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1708, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    2. Alogoskoufis, Spyros & Langfield, Sam, 2018. "Regulating the doom loop," ESRB Working Paper Series 74, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. Clemens Bonner & Iman Lelyveld & Robert Zymek, 2015. "Banks’ Liquidity Buffers and the Role of Liquidity Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 215-234, December.
    4. O. de Bandt & M. Chahad, 2016. "A DGSE Model to Assess the Post-Crisis Regulation of Universal Banks," Working papers 602, Banque de France.
    5. van Riet, Ad, 2016. "Government Funding Privileges in European Financial Law : Making Public Debt Everybody's Favourite?," Discussion Paper 2016-045, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. repec:bfr:rueban:2018:67 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Adi Mordel, 2018. "Prudential Liquidity Regulation in Banking-A Literature Review," Discussion Papers 18-8, Bank of Canada.
    8. repec:eee:finsta:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:311-330 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Sterzel, André & Neyer, Ulrike, 2017. "Capital Requirements for Government Bonds - Implications for Financial Stability," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168172, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Neyer, Ulrike & Sterzel, André, 2018. "Preferential treatment of government bonds in liquidity regulation: Implications for bank behaviour and financial stability," DICE Discussion Papers 301, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    11. Vlassopoulos, Thomas & C. Andreeva, Desislava, 2016. "Home bias in bank sovereign bond purchases and the bank-sovereign nexus," Working Paper Series 1977, European Central Bank.
    12. Liquidity, ECB Task Force on Systemic & Bonner, Clemens & Wedow, Michael, 2018. "Systemic liquidity concept, measurement and macroprudential instruments," Occasional Paper Series 214, European Central Bank.
    13. Martijn Boermans & Robert Vermeulen, 2018. "Quantitative easing and preferred habitat investors in the euro area bond market," DNB Working Papers 586, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    14. Meraj Allahrakha & Benjamin Munyan, 2016. "Do Higher Capital Standards Always Reduce Bank Risk? The Impact of the Basel Leverage Ratio on the U.S. Triparty Repo Market," Working Papers 16-11, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    15. S.M. Ali Abbas & Raphael Espinoza, 2016. "Why Do Banks in Developing Countries Hold Government Securities?," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 2016-1, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    government bonds; financial markets; regulation; liquidity; capital allocation;

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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