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Does intra-firm bargaining matter for business cycle dynamics?

  • Krause, Michael
  • Lubik, Thomas A.

We analyse the implications of intra-firm bargaining for business cycle dynamics in models with large firms and search frictions. Intra-firm bargaining implies a feedback effect from the marginal revenue product to wage setting which leads firms to over-hire in order to reduce workers' bargaining position within the firm. The key to this effect are decreasing returns and/or downward-sloping demand. We show that equilibrium wages and employment are higher in steady state compared to a bargaining framework in which firms neglect this feedback. However, the effects of intra-firm bargaining on adjustment dynamics, volatility and comovement are negligible.

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Paper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies with number 2007,17.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:6138
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  1. Antonella Trigari, 2009. "Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows, and Inflation Dynamics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 1-33, 02.
  2. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, June.
  3. Eric Smith, 1999. "Search, Concave Production, and Optimal Firm Size," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(2), pages 456-471, April.
  4. Krause, M.U. & Lubik, T.A., 2003. "The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage Rigidity in the New Keynesian Model with Search Frictions," Discussion Paper 2003-113, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Merz, Monika, 1995. "Search in the labor market and the real business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 269-300, November.
  6. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
  7. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2006. "Cyclical wages in a search-and-bargaining model with large firms," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  8. Cahuc, Pierre & Wasmer, Etienne, 2001. "Does Intrafirm Bargaining Matter In The Large Firm'S Matching Model?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(05), pages 742-747, November.
  9. Andolfatto, David, 1996. "Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 112-32, March.
  10. Monique Ebell & Christian Haefke, 2002. "Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes," Economics Working Papers 726, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2003.
  11. Matthias S. Hertweck, 2006. "Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility, and Persistence," Economics Working Papers ECO2006/42, European University Institute.
  12. Pierre Cahuc & Francois Marque & Etienne Wasmer, 2008. "A Theory Of Wages And Labor Demand With Intra-Firm Bargaining And Matching Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 943-972, 08.
  13. Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
  14. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March.
  15. repec:cup:macdyn:v:5:y:2002:i:05:p:742-747_03 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
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