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The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intra firm Bargaining

  • Fabien Tripier

    (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - UN - Université de Nantes)

In a matching and intrafi rm bargaining economy with constant return to scale production and matching technologies, large fi rms hire and train workers efficiently. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large fi rm to take into account the consequences of training on the wages bargained inside the fi rm. This intrafi rm bargaining process solves the hold-up problem that is associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient decisions of hiring and training.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00449625.

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Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00449625
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