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The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intra firm Bargaining

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  • Fabien Tripier

    (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - UN - Université de Nantes)

Abstract

In a matching and intrafi rm bargaining economy with constant return to scale production and matching technologies, large fi rms hire and train workers efficiently. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large fi rm to take into account the consequences of training on the wages bargained inside the fi rm. This intrafi rm bargaining process solves the hold-up problem that is associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient decisions of hiring and training.

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  • Fabien Tripier, 2010. "The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intra firm Bargaining," Working Papers hal-00449625, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00449625
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00449625
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Belan, Pascal & Chéron, Arnaud, 2014. "Turbulence, training and unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 16-29.

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