The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining
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- Fabien Tripier, 2010. "The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intra firm Bargaining," Working Papers hal-00449625, HAL.
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KeywordsTraining Human capital Matching Bargaining Efficiency;
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