Tax policy in a matching model with training
This paper develops a model of search on the labour market with training. We explore how the combination of an average job tax and a marginal wage tax can be used to alleviate inefficiencies in job matching and, at the same time, raise a positive revenue with minimal distortions in search and training. We find that (i) a wage tax is less distortionary to raise revenue than is a job tax if training is not distorted initially; (ii) this conclusion may reverse in the presence of training distortions; (iii) marginal wage taxes are less distortionary in economies where bargaining parties can commit to the wage profile. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 55 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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