Economic Effects of the New German Copyright Contract Law
This paper investigates some economic effects of recent amendments to the German Copyright Law on the German film industry. The changes assume the existence of a prevailing “structural superiority” of media companies over their contractual partners in labor markets which supposedly results in “unfair” contracts. We provide an economic approach to the matter. First, we consider potential effects and the plausibility of a “structural superiority” in terms of buyer power in the German film industry. Second, we consider how the new law affects risk allocation, incentives, transaction costs, and legal certainty in the business.
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