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Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Luke, Peter L.

    (CERT (Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation))

  • Schaffer, Mark E

    () (Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh)

Abstract

Using a firm level dataset from four regions of Russia covering 1996/97, an investigation was carried out into how the surplus created within the firm is divided between profits and wages. An efficient bargaining framework based on the work of Svejnar (1986) is employed which takes into account the alternative wage or outside option available to employees in the firm as well as the value added per employee. Statistical differences in the share of the surplus taken by employees employed in state, private and mixed forms of firms are found. In addition, the results prove sensitive to the presence of outliers and influential observations. A variety of diagnostic methods are employed to identify these influential observations and robust methods are employed to lessen the influence of them. Whereas in practice some of the diagnostic and robust methods utilised proved incapable of identifying or accommodating the gross outlier(s) in the data, the more successful methods included robust regression, Winsorising, the Hadi and Siminoff algorithm, Cook’s Distance and Covratio.

Suggested Citation

  • Luke, Peter L. & Schaffer, Mark E, 2000. "Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 143, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Svejnar, Jan, 1986. "Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1055-1078, September.
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    5. Lehmann, Hartmut & Wadsworth, Jonathan & Acquisti, Alessandro, 1999. "Grime and Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 595-617, December.
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    11. Lehmann, Hartmut & Wadsworth, Jonathan & Acquisti, Alessandro, 1999. "Grime and Punishment: Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation," IZA Discussion Papers 65, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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    Cited by:

    1. Konings, Jozef & Lehmann, Hartmut, 2002. "Marshall and Labor Demand in Russia: Going Back to Basics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 134-159, March.
    2. Thomas Dohmen & Hartmut Lehmann & Mark E. Schaffer, 2007. "Wage Determination and Wage Inequality Inside a Russian Firm in Late Transition: Evidence from Personnel Data - 1997 to 2002," ESCIRRU Working Papers 1, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Gimpelson, V. & Kapeliushnikov, R. & Lukyanova, A. & Ryzhikova, Z. & Kulyaeva, G., 2010. "Ownership and Wage Differentiation in Russia," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 5, pages 48-72.
    4. Ogloblin, Constantin & Brock, Gregory, 2005. "Wage determination in urban Russia: Underpayment and the gender differential," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 325-343, September.
    5. Jan J. Rutkowski & Stefano Scarpetta, 2005. "Enhancing Job Opportunities : Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7408, June.
    6. Elizabeth Brainerd, 2000. "How Does Privatization Affect Workers? The Case of the Russian Mass Privatization Program," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 303, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    7. S. Dobbelaere, 2003. "Ownership, Firm Size and Rent Sharing in a Transition Country," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 03/170, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    8. Dobbelaere, Sabien, 2004. "Ownership, firm size and rent sharing in Bulgaria," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 165-189, April.
    9. Maxim Bouev, 2005. "State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp764, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    10. Brainerd, Elizabeth, 2002. "Five Years after: The Impact of Mass Privatization on Wages in Russia, 1993-1998," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 160-190, March.
    11. Natália Monteiro & Miguel Portela & Odd Straume, 2011. "Firm Ownership and Rent Sharing," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 210-236, September.
    12. R. Kapelyushnikov., 2004. "Wage-setting Mechanisms in the Russian Industry," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 4.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Russian labour markets; efficient bargaining; outliers; regression diagnostics; robust regression;

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General

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