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Institutional Capacity for Policy Implementation : An Analytical Framework

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Listed:
  • Kim, Galileu
  • Kumar, Tanu
  • Ramalho, Rita
  • Russell, Stuart Ehrlich

Abstract

State capacity is an important prerequisite for policy implementation, yet at the country level it is difficult to measure, assess, and reform. This paper proposes a focus on institutional capacity: the ability of public institutions to implement the specific policy mandates for which they are responsible. Based on a review of existing literature, the paper defines the different dimensions that compose institutional capacity and groups them into two cross-cutting categories: organizational dimensions (personnel, financial resources, information systems, and management practices) and governance dimensions (transparency, independence, and accountability). The paper proposes measures for organizational and governance dimensions using existing data, shows intra-institutional variation of these measures within countries, and discusses how new data could be collected for better measurement of these concepts. Finally, the paper illustrates how the framework can be used to diagnose the sources of common problems related to weak policy implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Galileu & Kumar, Tanu & Ramalho, Rita & Russell, Stuart Ehrlich, 2026. "Institutional Capacity for Policy Implementation : An Analytical Framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11279, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11279
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