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The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India

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  • DASGUPTA, ADITYA
  • KAPUR, DEVESH

Abstract

Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for poor implementation emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture. This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload: local bureaucrats are often heavily under-resourced relative to their responsibilities. We advance a two-step theory explaining why bureaucratic overload is detrimental to implementation as well as why politicians under-invest in local bureaucracy, emphasizing a lack of electoral incentives. Drawing on a nationwide survey of local rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries that measure their daily behavior, we provide quantitative evidence that (i) officials with fewer resources are worse at implementing rural development programs, plausibly because they are unable to allocate enough time to managerial tasks and (ii) fewer resources are provided in administrative units where political responsibility for implementation is less clear. The findings shed light on the political economy and bureaucratic behavior underpinning weak local state capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Dasgupta, Aditya & Kapur, Devesh, 2020. "The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1316-1334, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:114:y:2020:i:4:p:1316-1334_24
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    Cited by:

    1. Foa, Roberto Stefan, 2022. "Decentralization, historical state capacity and public goods provision in Post-Soviet Russia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    2. Cooper, Bethany & Crase, Lin & Burton, Michael & Rigby, Dan & Alam, Mohammad Jahangir & Kishore, Avinash, 2023. "Policy preferences of experts seeking to raise and stabilise farm incomes in the Eastern Gangetic Plains," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 67(03), April.
    3. Max Gallien & Vanessa van den Boogaard, 2023. "Formalization and its Discontents: Conceptual Fallacies and Ways Forward," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 54(3), pages 490-513, May.
    4. Kalaj, Jozefina & Rogger, Daniel & Somani, Ravi, 2022. "Bureaucrat time-use: Evidence from a survey experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    5. Ken Ochieng' Opalo, 2021. "Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-147, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Naveen Kumar & Vinitha Varghese, 2022. "Elementary education in India versus China: Guidelines for NEP implementation," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-64, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Bethany Cooper & Lin Crase & Michael Burton & Dan Rigby & Mohammad Jahangir Alam & Avinash Kishore, 2023. "Policy preferences of experts seeking to raise and stabilise farm incomes in the Eastern Gangetic Plains," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 67(3), pages 323-345, July.
    8. De La O, Ana L. & González, Lucas I. & Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca, 2023. "Voluntary audits: Experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    9. Julio A. Ramos Pastrana, 2024. "Hit from abroad: Party dominance and the fiscal response to external economic shocks," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 7-38, March.
    10. Akshay Mangla, 2022. "Social conflict on the front lines of reform: Institutional activism and girls' education in rural India," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 95-105, February.

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