IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Credit Mismatch and Breakdown

This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers’ endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate information-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing, while entry and search frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics in its series Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series with number 7.

in new window

Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vil:papers:7
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Robin Boadway & Oana Secrieru & Marianne Vigneault, 2005. "A Search Model of Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Unemployment," Staff Working Papers 05-24, Bank of Canada.
  2. Wasmer, Etienne & Weil, Philippe, 2002. "The Macroeconomics of Labour and Credit Market Imperfections," CEPR Discussion Papers 3334, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2007. "Credit Traps and Credit Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 503-516, March.
  4. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April.
  5. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 1996. "Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations: a computable general equilibrium analysis," Working Paper 9602, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  6. Matteo Iacoviello, 2005. "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 739-764, June.
  7. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 1985. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Staff Report 87, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Irina A. Telyukova & Randall Wright, 2008. "A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 629-647.
  9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h48226q18 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Andre Kurmann & Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, 2006. "Credit Market Frictions with Costly Capital Reallocation as a Propagation Mechanism," 2006 Meeting Papers 365, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas & Wasmer, Etienne, 2010. "The Cyclical Volatility of Labor Markets under Frictional Financial Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 5131, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
  13. Jinyoung Hwang & Neville Jiang & Ping Wang, 2007. "Collusion And Overlending," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 691-707, October.
  14. Williamson, Stephen & Sanches, Daniel, 2009. "Money and Credit With Limited Commitment and Theft," MPRA Paper 20690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September.
  16. John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  17. Peter Diamond, 1990. "Pairwise Credit in Search Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 285-319.
  18. Robert Shimer & Randall Wright & Veronica Guerrieri, 2009. "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium," 2009 Meeting Papers 139, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  19. N/A, 2009. "On the Recession," Local Economy, London South Bank University, vol. 24(3), pages 253-253, May.
  20. Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, . "Money, Credit and Banking," IEW - Working Papers 219, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  21. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802002, EconWPA.
  22. Giulio, NICOLETTI & Olivier, PIERRARD, 2006. "Capital Market Frictions and the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006053, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  23. Acemoglu, Daron, 2001. "Credit market imperfections and persistent unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 665-679, May.
  24. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
  25. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1998. "What Makes an Entrepreneur?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 26-60, January.
  26. John F. Kain, 1968. "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 175-197.
  27. den Haan, Wouter J. & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Liquidity Flows and Fragility of business Enterprises," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3d899423, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  28. Becsi, Zsolt & Li, Victor E. & Wang, Ping, 2005. "Heterogeneous borrowers, liquidity, and the search for credit," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(8), pages 1331-1360, August.
  29. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M., 2004. "The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start-up firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 319-356, May.
  30. Satoru Kanoh & Chakkrit Pumpaisanchai, 2006. "Listening to the Market: Estimating Credit Demand and Supply from Survey Data," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-137, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  31. Evans, David S & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 808-27, August.
  32. Andrea Gerali & Stefano Neri & Luca Sessa & Federico M. Signoretti, 2010. "Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 107-141, 09.
  33. John Fender & Ping Wang, 2001. "Educational Policy in a Credit Constrained Economy with Skill Heterogeneity," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0133, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  34. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1997. "On the Profitability and Cost of Relationship Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-43, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  35. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
  36. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  37. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Pietro Garibaldi, 2005. "Gross Credit Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 665-685.
  38. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vil:papers:7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher Kilby)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.