IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Credit mismatch and breakdown

  • Becsi, Zsolt
  • Li, Victor E.
  • Wang, Ping
Registered author(s):

    This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292112001481
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 59 (2013)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 109-125

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:59:y:2013:i:c:p:109-125
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1997. "On the Profitability and Cost of Relationship Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-43, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Giulio, NICOLETTI & Olivier, PIERRARD, 2006. "Capital Market Frictions and the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006053, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    3. Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Credit Market Imperfections and Persistent Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 7938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Matteo Iacoviello, 2005. "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 739-764, June.
    5. Berentsen, Aleksander & Camera, Gabriele & Waller, Christopher, 2007. "Money, credit and banking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 171-195, July.
    6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41, February.
    7. John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    8. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802002, EconWPA.
    9. Jinyoung Hwang & Neville Jiang & Ping Wang, 2007. "Collusion And Overlending," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 691-707, October.
    10. Robin Boadway & Oana Secrieru & Marianne Vigneault, 2005. "A Search Model of Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Unemployment," Working Papers 05-24, Bank of Canada.
    11. DellAriccia, Giovanni & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2000. "Gross Credit Flows," CEPR Discussion Papers 2569, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. den Haan, Wouter J. & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Liquidity Flows and Fragility of Business Enterprises," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2kc182ts, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    13. Becsi, Zsolt & Li, Victor E. & Wang, Ping, 2005. "Heterogeneous borrowers, liquidity, and the search for credit," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(8), pages 1331-1360, August.
    14. Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau & Etienne Wasmer, . "The cyclical volatility of labor markets under frictional financial markets," GSIA Working Papers 2010-E1, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    15. Blanchflower, D.G. & Oswald, A., 1991. "What Makes an Entrepreneur?," Economics Series Working Papers 99125, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    16. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2009. "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 14915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. André Kurmann & Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, 2007. "Search Frictions in Physical Capital Markets as a Propagation Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 0712, CIRPEE.
    18. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2007. "Credit Traps and Credit Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 503-516, March.
    19. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 1996. "Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations: a computable general equilibrium analysis," Working Paper 9602, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    20. Andrea Gerali & Stefano Neri & Luca Sessa & Federico M. Signoretti, 2010. "Credit and banking in a DSGE model of the euro area," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 740, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    21. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September.
    22. Williamson, Stephen & Sanches, Daniel, 2009. "Money and Credit With Limited Commitment and Theft," MPRA Paper 20690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Etienne Wasmer & Philippe Weil, 2004. "The Macroeconomics of Labor and Credit Market Imperfections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 944-963, September.
    24. Diamond, Peter, 1990. "Pairwise Credit in Search Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 285-319, May.
    25. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April.
    26. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h48226q18 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Irina A. Telyukova & Randall Wright, 2007. "A model of money and credit, with application to the credit card debt puzzle," Working Paper 0711, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    28. John Fender & Ping Wang, 2003. "Educational Policy in a Credit Constrained Economy with Skill Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 939-964, 08.
    29. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
    30. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
    31. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M., 2004. "The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start-up firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 319-356, May.
    32. Evans, David S & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 808-27, August.
    33. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April.
    34. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
    35. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    36. Satoru Kanoh & Chakkrit Pumpaisanchai, 2006. "Listening to the Market: Estimating Credit Demand and Supply from Survey Data," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-137, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:59:y:2013:i:c:p:109-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.