IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Credit mismatch and breakdown

  • Becsi, Zsolt
  • Li, Victor E.
  • Wang, Ping

This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 59 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 109-125

in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:59:y:2013:i:c:p:109-125
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April.
  2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h48226q18 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau & Etienne Wasmer, . "The cyclical volatility of labor markets under frictional financial markets," GSIA Working Papers 2010-E1, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  4. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 1996. "Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations: a computable general equilibrium analysis," Working Paper 9602, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  5. Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera, 2004. "Money, Credit, and Banking," 2004 Meeting Papers 473, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. DellAriccia, Giovanni & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2000. "Gross Credit Flows," CEPR Discussion Papers 2569, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Wouter den Haan & Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Liquidity Flows and Fragility of Business Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 7057, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September.
  9. Wasmer, Etienne & Weil, Philippe, 2002. "The Macroeconomics of Labour and Credit Market Imperfections," CEPR Discussion Papers 3334, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
  11. André Kurmann & Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, 2007. "Search Frictions in Physical Capital Markets as a Propagation Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 0712, CIRPEE.
  12. repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:285-319 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Irina A. Telyukova & Randall Wright, 2008. "A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 629-647.
  14. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2007. "Credit Traps and Credit Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 503-516, March.
  15. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  16. Zsolt Becsi & Victor Li & Ping Wang, . "Heterogeneous Borrowers, Liquidity, and the Search for Credit," Departmental Working Papers 2002-02, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  17. Andrea Gerali & Stefano Neri & Luca Sessa & Federico M. Signoretti, 2010. "Credit and banking in a DSGE model of the euro area," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 740, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  18. Acemoglu, Daron, 2001. "Credit market imperfections and persistent unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 665-679, May.
  19. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April.
  20. Matteo Iacoviello, 2005. "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 739-764, June.
  21. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Paper 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  22. repec:oup:qjecon:v:113:y:1998:i:1:p:1-41 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2009. "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 14915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Jinyoung Hwang & Neville Jiang & Ping Wang, 2007. "Collusion And Overlending," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 691-707, October.
  25. Williamson, Stephen & Sanches, Daniel, 2009. "Money and Credit With Limited Commitment and Theft," MPRA Paper 20690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Satoru Kanoh & Chakkrit Pumpaisanchai, 2006. "Listening to the Market: Estimating Credit Demand and Supply from Survey Data," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-137, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  27. Blanchflower, D.G. & Oswald, A., 1991. "What Makes an Entrepreneur?," Economics Series Working Papers 99125, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  28. Robin Boadway & Oana Secrieru & Marianne Vigneault, 2005. "A Search Model of Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Unemployment," Staff Working Papers 05-24, Bank of Canada.
  29. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
  30. Giulio, NICOLETTI & Olivier, PIERRARD, 2006. "Capital Market Frictions and the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006053, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  31. John Fender & Ping Wang, 2001. "Educational Policy in a Credit Constrained Economy with Skill Heterogeneity," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0133, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  32. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-48, April.
  33. Berlin, Mitchell & Mester, Loretta J., 1998. "On the profitability and cost of relationship lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 873-897, August.
  34. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
  35. Evans, David S & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 808-27, August.
  36. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M., 2004. "The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start-up firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 319-356, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:59:y:2013:i:c:p:109-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.