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Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs

Author

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  • Benoît LE MAUX

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)

  • Sarah NECKER

    (University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland)

  • Yvon ROCABOY

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)

Abstract

We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoît LE MAUX & Sarah NECKER & Yvon ROCABOY, 2016. "Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2016-03-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2016-03-ccr
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    2. Guo, Xiaolong & Li, Xiaoxiao & Yu, Yugang, 2021. "Publication delay adjusted impact factor: The effect of publication delay of articles on journal impact factor," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1).
    3. Mads P. Sørensen & Tine Ravn & Ana Marušić & Andrea Reyes Elizondo & Panagiotis Kavouras & Joeri K. Tijdink & Anna-Kathrine Bendtsen, 2021. "Strengthening research integrity: which topic areas should organisations focus on?," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-15, December.
    4. Levati, M. Vittoria & Nardi, Chiara, 2023. "Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    5. Pfeil, Katharina & Necker, Sarah & Feld, Lars P., 2023. "Compliance management in research institutes: Boon or bane?," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 23/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    6. Anna Abalkina & Alexander Libman, 2020. "The real costs of plagiarism: Russian governors, plagiarized PhD theses, and infrastructure in Russian regions," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 125(3), pages 2793-2820, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics of Science; Contract Theory; Scientific Misbehavior; Social Norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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