Incentive Effects in Asymmetric Tournaments Empirical Evidence from the German Hockey League
Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants of a tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using a large dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed the intensity of a game is lower if the teams are more heterogeneous. This effect can be observed for the game as a whole as well as for the ?rst and last third. When dividing the teams in the dataset into favorites and underdogs, we only observe a reduction of effort provision from favorite teams. As the number of games per team changes between different seasons, we can also investigate the effect of a changing spread between winner and loser prize. In line with theory, teams reduce effort if the spread declines. Interestingly, effort is also sensitive to the total number of teams in the league even if the price spread remains unchanged.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alannah Orrison & Andrew Schotter & Keith Weigelt, 2004. "Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(2), pages 268-279, February.
- Madhav V. Rajan & Stefan Reichelstein, 2006. "Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 585-618, 06.
- O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
- Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2001.
"Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse33_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Sunde, Uwe, 2009.
"Heterogeneity and performance in tournaments: A test for incentive effects using professional tennis data,"
Munich Reprints in Economics
19585, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Uwe Sunde, 2009. "Heterogeneity and performance in tournaments: a test for incentive effects using professional tennis data," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(25), pages 3199-3208.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009.
"American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?,"
Journal of Cultural Economics,
Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 265-277, November.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(16), pages A0.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2171, CESifo Group Munich.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," MPRA Paper 6465, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," Working Papers 0708, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Christine Harbring & Gabriele K. Lünser, 2008. "On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9, pages 373-395, 08.
- Gurtler, Oliver, 2008. "On sabotage in collective tournaments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 383-393, February.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
- Hans Gersbach, 2009.
"Competition of politicians for wages and office,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(4), pages 533-553, May.
- Dragon, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1996. "A collective tournament," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 223-227, February.
- Warneryd, Karl, 2000.
"In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, October.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 1996. "In Defense of Lawyers. Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 126, Stockholm School of Economics.
- George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 921-955.
- Woodland, Linda M & Woodland, Bill M, 1994. " Market Efficiency and the Favorite-Longshot Bias: The Baseball Betting Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 269-79, March.
- Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1987.
"Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 1-33, February.
- Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1985. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 85-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Haiwen Zhou, 2006. "R&D Tournaments with Spillovers," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(3), pages 327-339, September.
- Fredrik Heyman, 2005.
"Pay inequality and firm performance: evidence from matched employer-employee data,"
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(11), pages 1313-1327.
- Heyman, Fredrik, 2002. "Pay Inequality and Firm Performance: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data," Working Paper Series 186, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research.
- Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1988.
"Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?,"
NBER Working Papers
2638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:sae:ilrrev:v:43:y:1990:i:3:p:74-88 is not listed on IDEAS
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.