Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination
Modern hierarchical organizations, like corporations, must motivate agents to work hard. Given their pyramid structure, it is not surprising that one commonly used motivator is the promotion tournament. In such tournaments, agents compete to advance to positions at higher organizational levels. Though these tournaments are common, little research has empirically looked at the interface of organizational structure and tournament design. This paper aims to take a step in filling this void by comparing the performance of various tournament designs using controlled laboratory techniques.
Volume (Year): 50 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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