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Discrimination and Workers' Expectations: Experimental Evidence

  • Filippin, Antonio

    ()

    (University of Milan)

This paper is an experimental analysis of the role played by workers’ expectations in explaining the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimination against certain minorities in the labor market. The experiment provides some evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that unequal outcomes may emerge due to disadvantaged workers’ wrong expectations of being discriminated against. However, this effect is not long-lasting, since players learn the true state of nature in later stages of the experiment, failing to generate a Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by wrong beliefs. The strategy method provides additional evidence that expectations matter.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 824.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp824
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  1. Filippin, Antonio & Ichino, Andrea, 2003. "Gender Wage Gap in Expectations and Realizations," IZA Discussion Papers 825, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  4. Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations," Departmental Working Papers 2003-15, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
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  6. Holm, Håkan, 2000. "Stereotypes, Sex Discrimination and Paranoia - an experimental study," Working Papers 2000:1, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2000.
  7. Marimon Ramon & Spear Stephen E. & Sunder Shyam, 1993. "Expectationally Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 74-103, October.
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  16. Kenneth Arrow, 1971. "The Theory of Discrimination," Working Papers 403, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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  18. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2010. "A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1193, David K. Levine.
  19. Davis, Douglas D., 1987. "Maximal quality selection and discrimination in employment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 97-112, March.
  20. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1985. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 85-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  21. Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. "Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
  22. Shaun Hargreaves-Heap & Yanis Varoufakis, 2002. "Some Experimental Evidence On The Evolution Of Discrimination, Co--Operation And Perceptions Of Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 679-703, July.
  23. Roth, Alvin E, 1994. "Lets Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ.: A Methodological Note," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 279-89.
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