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Discrimination and Workers' Expectations: Experimental Evidence

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  • Filippin, Antonio

    (University of Milan)

Abstract

This paper is an experimental analysis of the role played by workers’ expectations in explaining the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimination against certain minorities in the labor market. The experiment provides some evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that unequal outcomes may emerge due to disadvantaged workers’ wrong expectations of being discriminated against. However, this effect is not long-lasting, since players learn the true state of nature in later stages of the experiment, failing to generate a Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by wrong beliefs. The strategy method provides additional evidence that expectations matter.

Suggested Citation

  • Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 824, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp824
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    Cited by:

    1. Vaishali Zambre, 2018. "The Gender Gap in Wage Expectations: Do Young Women Trade off Higher Wages for Lower Wage Risk?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1742, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," IZA Discussion Papers 823, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Filippin, Antonio & Ichino, Andrea, 2005. "Gender wage gap in expectations and realizations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 125-145, February.
    4. Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations," Departmental Working Papers 2003-15, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; discrimination; workers’ expectations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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