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The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism

Listed author(s):
  • Sergei Guriev
  • Andrei Rachinsky

    (Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR))

Using a unique dataset, we describe the degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian "oligarchs" do control a substantial part of the economy. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. The oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other Russian owners controlling for industry, region and size.

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File URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/1cu21pio6c90g9i5oedr5hnaa3/resources/gurievrachinsky.pdf
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Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/1cu21pio6c90g9i5oedr5hnaa3.

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Date of creation: Mar 2005
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005, pp.131-150
Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1cu21pio6c90g9i5oedr5hnaa3
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