The Employment (and Output) of Nations: Theory and Policy Implications
I study a model where firms bargain with unions over wages and employment levels. This interaction generates unemployment. Households take unemployment risk as given in making their participation decisions. I am thus able to study the interactions of product and labor market institutions in a three-states representation of the labor market. Unemployment matters because is inserts a wedge between labor supply (participation) and employment. Employment matters because it determines output. I uncover two feedback mechanisms, each reinforced by endogenous participation. The firt exploits the endogeneity of the number of firms to amplify the adverse effects on output of regulations and frictions that raise labor costs, work practice rigidities and the bargaining power of workers. The second exploits the endogeneity of market size to amplify the adverse effects of product market frictions that raise the costs of entry or of operation for firms. The multiplier effects due to these feedback mechanisms have interesting implications for the current policy debate. Labor market reforms that reduce the cost of labor are actually more attractive when one considers the endogenous structure of the product market. Similarly, pro-competitive product market reforms are more attractive when one considers the positive feedback on market structure that runs through the labor market
|Date of creation:||03 Dec 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard Layard & Stephen Nickell, 1998.
"Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0407, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Nickell, Stephen & Layard, Richard, 1999. "Labor market institutions and economic performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 3029-3084 Elsevier.
- Nickell, S. & Layard, R., 1997. "Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance," Papers 23, Centre for Economic Performance & Institute of Economics.
- Gersbach, Hans, 2000. "Promoting Product Market Competition to Reduce Unemployment in Europe: An Alternative Approach?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 117-33.
- Spector, David, 2002.
"Competiton and the capital-labor conflict,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Paul Geroski & Paul Gregg & John van Reenen, 1995. "Market Imperfections and Employment," OECD Jobs Study Working Papers 5, OECD Publishing.
- Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed006:280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.