A Lindahl Solution to International Emissions Trading

Author Info

Listed author(s):
• Yukihiro Nishimura

()

(Yokohama National University and Queen's University)

Registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider international negotiations on the level of global pollution, and examine the Lindahl solution which determines the distribution of the pollution permits with unanimous agreement. We show various properties to clarify difficulties to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation as an agreement. The Lindahl solution may result in an unfair allocation, and it does not belong to the $\gamma$-core as in other solutions based on emissions trading. On the other hand, we provide mechanisms that implement the Lindahl solution as the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also consider the market with region-specific prices as a device to induce second-best Pareto efficient allocations.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1177.pdf
File Function: First version 2008

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1177.

as
in new window

 Length: 45 pages Date of creation: Aug 2008 Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1177 Contact details of provider: Postal: Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6Phone: (613) 533-2250Fax: (613) 533-6668Web page: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/Email: More information through EDIRC

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

1. Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-255, May.
2. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
3. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006. "Compensation and responsibility," Working Papers halshs-00121367, HAL.
4. Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2002. "An Equitable, Efficient and Implementable Scheme to Control Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions," Working Papers 2002-22, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
5. Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April.
6. Tian Guoqiang, 1994. "Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 568-584, December.
7. Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005. "Possibility and Optimality of Agreements in International Negotiations on Climate Change," Discussion Papers 2004-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
8. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., "undated". "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
9. Roemer, J.E., 1988. "On Public Ownership," Papers 317, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
10. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
11. Arthur J. Caplan & Richard C. Cornes & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2003. "An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 216-234, April.
12. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
13. Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
14. Shiell, Leslie, 2003. "Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 38-51, July.
15. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
16. Eyckmans, Johan, 1997. "Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 314-330, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Babcock)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.