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Think Globally, Act Globally: Opportunities to Mitigate Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries

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Listed:
  • Rachel Glennerster

    (University of Chicago)

  • Seema Jayachandran

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are a global public good, which makes it efficient to act globally when addressing this challenge. We lay out several reasons that high-income countries seeking to mitigate climate change might have greater impact if they invest their resources in opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Specifically, some of the easiest and cheapest options have already been tapped in high-income countries, land and labor costs are lower in low- and middle-income countries, it is cheaper to build green than to retrofit green, and global targeting matters in integrated economies. We also discuss economic counterarguments such as the challenge of monitoring emissions levels in low and middle-income countries, ethical considerations, the importance of not double counting mitigation funding as development aid, and policy steps that might help to realize this opportunity.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachel Glennerster & Seema Jayachandran, 2023. "Think Globally, Act Globally: Opportunities to Mitigate Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries," Working Papers 313, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:313
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change; mitigation; Paris Agreement; greenhouse gas emissions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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