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Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités
[Modern optimal governance of universities]

Author

Listed:
  • Jellal, Mohamed

Abstract

This paper is a theoretical introduction to modern governance of universities in developing countries. Indeed, adopting the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of the presence of information asymmetry between the State and the university. The State, through taxation is responsible for funding education. We show that presence of asymmetric information between the state and a representative university generates a sub-optimal allocation. Indeed, the situation of private information on all relevant variables naturally creates a situation of rent for university. Therefore, given the cost of public funds and in order to reduce the rent of public universities the state is led to create strategic distortion that actually lead to limit the rent, which results in terms of allocation to a second-best solution associated to a decline in performance of university.

Suggested Citation

  • Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités
    [Modern optimal governance of universities]
    ," MPRA Paper 57275, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57275
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57275/1/MPRA_paper_57275.pdf
    File Function: original version
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gautier, Axel & Wauthy, Xavier, 2007. "Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 273-295, February.
    2. De Fraja, Gianni & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2002. "Competition among Universities and the Emergence of the Elite Institution," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 275-293, July.
    3. Rey, Elena Del, 2001. "Teaching versus Research: A Model of State University Competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 356-373, March.
    4. John Beath & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & David Ulph, 2005. "University Funding Systems and their Impact on Research and Teaching: A General Framework," Discussion Paper Series 2005_2, Department of Economics, Loughborough University.
    5. Graves, Philip E & Marchand, James R & Thompson, Randal, 1982. "Economics Departmental Rankings: Research Incentives, Constraints, and Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1131-1141, December.
    6. George Psacharopoulos, 2004. "Public versus private University Systems," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(4), pages 39-43, 01.
    7. Ehrenberg, R.G.Ronald G., 2004. "Econometric studies of higher education," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1-2), pages 19-37.
    8. Becker, William E, Jr, 1979. "Professorial Behavior Given a Stochastic Reward Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 1010-1017, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Higher Education; Universities; Regulation; Governance; Information ; Contract theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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