Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem
The asylum seekers who choose the level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital, and the government of the host country that chooses the probability of naturalization are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their choosing.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Letters 3.108(2010): pp. 286-290|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Timothy J. Hatton, 2004. "Seeking asylum in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 5-62, 04.
- Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
- Giovanni Facchini & Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2006.
"Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 411-430, June.
- Giovanni Facchini & Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2005. "Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato," Development Working Papers 205, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
- Fabio, MARIANI, 2004. "The Political Economy of Immigrants Naturalization," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2004022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)