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L'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité: une étude expérimentale
[Gender bias in trustworthiness]

  • Bonein, Aurélie
  • Serra, Daniel

Gender differences are often observed in real life-situations. We implement an experiment on the investment game which explores the influence of knowledge of partner's gender in trust and reciprocity by means of two treatments of information: the first one, without knowledge of partner's gender and the second treatment where gender's partner is common knowledge. A great heterogeneity of individuals’ behaviors is observed: from selfish behavior to complete trust and trustworthiness. Knowledge of responder’s gender does not imply different sending, even if men trust more their partners than women. However, a phenomenon of gender bias dominates in trustworthiness behavior.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2523/1/MPRA_paper_2523.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2523.

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Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2523
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