Personality preferences in laboratory economics experiments
Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects' decisions. With controls for personality preferences, we find little evidence of behavioral differences between males and females. Furthermore, we conclude that seniority breeds feelings of entitlement--seniors at USNA generally exhibited the least cooperative or other-regarding behavior.
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Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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