Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in Ultimatum Games
This paper uses responder pre-commitment and psychological type, as measured by the Myers- Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being accepted. Offers are higher when proposers know that responders make a binding pre-commitment to reject but are not different when a hostage is present. Responders make lower pre-commitments when they are binding and when a hostage is present. Behavior in our experiment is generally consistent with hypotheses based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological type.
|Date of creation:||May 2005|
|Date of revision:||May 2005|
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