Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game
I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players' gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the gender of player 1. Offers are affected by the gender of player 2, with men attracting higher offers, particularly from female players 1. Players 2 of both genders choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when facing a female player 1. These patterns led to substantial differences in earnings. Such striking differences in expectations and decisions could impact salary negotiations and other real-world transactions. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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