IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/323.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Quis custodiet quem? Sovereign Debt and Bondholders` Protection Before 1914

Author

Listed:
  • Rui Pedro Esteves

Abstract

The half-century before World War I has been characterized as the first age of financial globalization. This paper focuses on the role and significance of the bondholders` organizations for the governance of this market. I argue that the outcome of these institutions depended on two dimensions: the institutional variation that characterized these organizations and their strategic interaction. These aspects are addressed using a model of sovereign debt with constant renegotiation. An original data set with information on the settlement of defaulted debts in the period 1870-1913 is used to test the implications of the model. Empirical results support the premise that the quality of bondholders` representation matters for the terms of settlement and the costs of renegotiation. Renegotiation-friendly but not debtor-friendly organizations yielded the best ex post results for their members. The representation of bondholders` interests by the issue banks on the other hand, produced inferior outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Rui Pedro Esteves, 2007. "Quis custodiet quem? Sovereign Debt and Bondholders` Protection Before 1914," Economics Series Working Papers 323, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:323
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper323.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fishlow, Albert, 1985. "Lessons from the past: capital markets during the 19th century and the interwar period," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(03), pages 383-439, June.
    2. Christopher M. Meissner, 2003. "Exchange-Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 344-353, March.
    3. Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2004. "Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary," NBER Working Papers 10729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989. "How Sovereign Debt Has Worked," NBER Chapters,in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 39-106 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
    6. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2004. "A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default, and Credit," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(s1), pages 50-63, June.
    7. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
    8. Barry Eichengreen & Kenneth Kletzer & Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis resolution: next steps," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    9. Michael D. Bordo & Finn E. Kydland, 1990. "The Gold Standard as a Rule," NBER Working Papers 3367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 1995. "Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean independence assumptions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 115-132, July.
    11. Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes., 1988. "Settling Defaults in the Era of Bond Finance," Economics Working Papers 8885, University of California at Berkeley.
    12. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    13. Paolo Mauro & Yishay Yafeh, 2003. "The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders," IMF Working Papers 03/107, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Bordo, Michael D. & Rockoff, Hugh, 1996. "The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 389-428, June.
    15. Portes, Richard, 2004. "Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises: The New Old Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 4717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Barry Eichengreen, 2003. "Restructuring Sovereign Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 75-98, Fall.
    17. Obstfeld,Maurice & Taylor,Alan M., 2005. "Global Capital Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671798, August.
    18. Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2005. "Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment," NBER Working Papers 11472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau & Jacques-Marie Vaslin, 2013. "Waterloo: a Godsend for French Public Finances?," Working Papers 0041, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    2. Mauricio Drelichman & Joachim Voth, 2007. "Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598," Economics Working Papers 1164, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2009.
    3. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
    4. Vincent Bignon & Rui Esteves & Alfonso Herranz-Loncán, 2015. "Big push or big grab? Railways, government activism, and export growth in Latin America, 1865–1913," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(4), pages 1277-1305, November.
    5. repec:eee:inecon:v:107:y:2017:i:c:p:91-110 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:sol:spaper:2013/145739 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Marc Flandreau, 2013. "Sovereign states, bondholders committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the nineteenth century (1827–68): new facts and old fictions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 668-696, WINTER.
    8. Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, 2007. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(10), pages 1491-1509, October.
    9. Rui Esteves & João Tovar Jalles, 2016. "Like Father Like Sons? The Cost of Sovereign Defaults in Reduced Credit to the Private Sector," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(7), pages 1515-1545, October.
    10. Flandreau, Marc & Flores Zendejas, Juan Huitzilihuitl, 2010. "Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, 1815-1913," CEPR Discussion Papers 7915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Ali Coskun Tuncer, 2009. "„What did guide investors decisions” during the classical gold standard era? The case of Ottoman Empire, 1880-1914," SEEMHN papers 2, National Bank of Serbia.
    12. Kim Oosterlinck, 2013. "Sovereign Debt Defaults: Insights from History," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 29(4), pages 697-714.
    13. Marc Flandreau, Juan Flores, 2010. "Hamlet Without The Prince of Denmark: Relationship Banking and Conditionality Lending In The London Market For Foreign Government Debt, 1815 - 1913," IHEID Working Papers 08-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    14. Mauricio Drelichman & Hans‐Joachim Voth, 2011. "Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt and Default in the Age of Philip II," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1205-1227, December.
    15. Vincent Bignon & Rui Esteves & Alfonso Herranz-Loncán, 2015. "Big push or big grab? Railways, government activism, and export growth in Latin America, 1865–1913," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(4), pages 1277-1305, November.
    16. Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, 2013. "Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 85-117, July.
    17. Dragana Gnjatoviæ, 2009. "Foreign long term government loans of Serbia 1862-1914," SEEMHN papers 11, National Bank of Serbia.
    18. Flores Zendejas, Juan, 2015. "Capital Markets and Sovereign Defaults: A Historical Perspective," Working Papers unige:73325, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    19. Marc Flandreau & Juan Flores, 2011. "Bondholders vs. bond-sellers? Investment banks and conditionality lending in the London market for foreign government debt, 1815-1913," Working Papers 0002, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    20. Stephen Quinn, 2008. "Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750," Working Papers 200701, Texas Christian University, Department of Economics.
    21. Catão, Luis A.V. & Mano, Rui C., 2017. "Default premium," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 91-110.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign defaults; Bondholders` organizations; Pre-1913;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:323. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Pouliquen). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sfeixuk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.