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Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Vikas Mehrotra
  • Randall Morck
  • Jungwook Shim
  • Yupana Wiwattanakantang

Abstract

The practice of adopting adults, even if one has biological children, makes Japanese family firms unusually competitive. Our nearly population-wide panel of postwar listed nonfinancial firms shows inherited family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well - an unusual finding for a developed economy. Adopted heirs' firms outperform blood heirs' firms, and match or nearly match founder-run listed firms. Both adopted and blood heirs' firms outperform non-family firms. Using family structure variables as instruments, we find adopted heirs "causing" elevated performance. These findings are consistent with adult adoptees displacing blood heirs in the left tail of the talent distribution, with the "adopted son" job motivating star managers, and with the threat of displacement inducing blood heirs to invest in human capital, mitigating the so-called "Carnegie conjecture" that inherited wealth deadens talent.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16874.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 16874.

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Date of creation: Mar 2011
Publication status: published as Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall & Shim, Jungwook & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2013. "Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 840-854.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16874
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
  • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
  • N25 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Asia including Middle East

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Cited by:

  1. Pramodita Sharma & Jess Chua, 2013. "Asian family enterprises and family business research," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 641-656, September.
  2. repec:eee:intfin:v:48:y:2017:i:c:p:47-60 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Block, Joern H. & Jaskiewicz, Peter & Miller, Danny, 2011. "Ownership versus management effects on performance in family and founder companies: A Bayesian reconciliation," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 232-245.
  4. Lloyd Steier, 2009. "Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 513-535, September.
  5. Masayuki Morikawa, 2014. "What Types of Company Have Female and Foreign Directors?," CAMA Working Papers 2014-47, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  6. Cao, Jerry & Cumming, Douglas & Wang, Xiaoming, 2015. "One-child policy and family firms in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 317-329.
  7. ASABA Shigeru, 2017. "Do Family Firms Have Worse (or Better) Management Practices?," Discussion papers 17052, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  8. Blind, Georg & Lottanti von Mandach, Stefania, 2015. "Not a Coincidence: Sons-in-Law as Successors in Successful Japanese Family Firms," MPRA Paper 66695, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Shim, Jungwook & Okamuro, Hiroyuki, 2011. "Does ownership matter in mergers? A comparative study of the causes and consequences of mergers by family and non-family firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 193-203, January.
  10. Masayuki Morikawa, 2014. "What Types of Companies Have Female and Foreign Directors?," AJRC Working Papers 1404, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  11. Morikawa, Masayuki, 2016. "What types of companies have female directors? Evidence from Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 1-7.
  12. Joern, Block & Peter, Jaskiewicz & Danny, Miller, 2010. "Ownership versus Management Effects on Performance in Family and Founder Companies: A Bayesian Analysis," MPRA Paper 23526, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary, 2016. "Family control, accounting misstatements, and market reactions to restatements: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-27.
  14. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary Gang, 2015. "Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 220-245.
  15. Nzinga Broussard & Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2015. "(Why) Do self-employed parents have more children?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 297-321, June.
  16. Maria Rosaria Carillo & Vincenzo Lombardo & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Family Firm Connections and Entrepreneurial Human Capital in the Process of Development," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 89, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
  17. Mullins, William & Schoar, Antoinette, 2016. "How do CEOs see their roles? Management philosophies and styles in family and non-family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 24-43.
  18. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2016. "Self-fulfilling Distortion and Ownership Structure: Market Discipline and Owner fs Dominance at the Dawn of the Japanese Capitalism," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f181, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 29 Sep 2016.
  19. Tai-Yuan Chen & Zhaoyang Gu & Keiichi Kubota & Hitoshi Takehara, 2015. "Accrual-Based and Real Activities Based Earnings Management Behavior of Family Firms in Japan," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 5, pages 21-47, December.
  20. William Mullins & Antoinette Schoar, 2013. "How do CEOs see their Role? Management Philosophy and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms," NBER Working Papers 19395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Bennedsen, Morten & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Jian, Ming & Yeh, Yin-Hua, 2015. "The family business map: Framework, selective survey, and evidence from Chinese family firm succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 212-226.
  22. Hwang, Sunwoo & Kim, Woochan, 2016. "When heirs become major shareholders: Evidence on pyramiding financed by related-party sales," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 23-42.

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