Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the UK
Family ownership was rapidly diluted in the twentieth century in Britain. The main cause was equity issued in the process of making acquisitions. In the first half of the century, it occurred in the absence of minority investor protection and relied on directors of target firms protecting the interests of shareholders. Families were able to retain control by occupying a disproportionate number of seats on the boards of firms. However, in the absence of large stakes, the rise of hostile takeovers and institutional shareholders made it increasingly difficult for families to maintain control without challenge. Potential targets attempted to protect themselves through dual class shares and strategic share blocks but these were dismantled in response to opposition by institutional shareholders and the London Stock Exchange. The result was a regulated market in corporate control and a capital market that looked very different from its European counterparts. Thus, while acquisitions facilitated the growth of family controlled firms in the first half of the century, they also diluted their ownership and ultimately their control in the second half.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2005. "Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the United Kingdom," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 581-612 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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"The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century,"
CRSP working papers
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- Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 1996. "Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 163-181, January.
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